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to the breakdown of a questionable distinction between subsequent pur-
chasers and mortgagees.
It is noteworthy that the facts of the principal case arose before the
Certificate of Title Act became effective."4 This act would preclude
the problem of the principal case by providing title registration and
a recordation of encumbrances on the certificate of tide, thus facilitating
actual notice. But the act is narrow in its scope, referring only to
motor vehicles, leaving the problem discussed above still alive with respect
to other chattels.
J.P.M.
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE- DUTY OF PLAINTIFF- PROXIMATE CAUSE
Plaintiff brought an action against the Board of County Commis-
sioners for the destruction of her home by fire. Liability was predicated
upon a statute which made the commissioners liable in their official
capacity for damages, caused by their negligence, in not keeping roads
or bridges in repair.1 The commissioners had allowed a ditch to remain
open across a county road, making it impossible for the apparatus of the
fire department to reach the scene of the fire, and prevent the subsequent
damage. On these facts, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County
held that the defendants were not liable, because the plaintiff was not
included within the class of persons protected by statute, and because
the blockade of the road was not the proximate cause of the loss.2
It is often said in negligence actions, that to enable the plaintiff to
maintain an action, he must show that the defendant owed him a duty
of reasonable care, and that such a duty is owing to the plaintiff, if and
only if, the defendant should anticipate that some one in the position of
the plaintiff might be hurt, if the defendant did not use reasonable care.
A leading case announcing this doctrine is Palsgraff v. Long Island
Railroad Co.3 In that case the plaintiff was denied recovery for being
injured by a set of scales, falling from overhead as a result of an explosion
of a package of fire crackers some distance away, which were knocked
" Onto G.C. sec. 6z90-i to -z2, Effective Jan. 1, 1938. This act is not retroactivei
see OHio G.C. sec. 6290-9.
' OHio G.C. sec. 6z9o-4 and -9. By provision in Oaso G.C. sec. 629o-9 the Chattel
Mortgage Recording Act, cited note 13 supra, shall never apply to motor vehicles.
' OHio G.C. sec. 2408. The board (of county commissioners) shall be liable in its
official capacity for damages received by reason of its negligence or carelessness in not
keeping any such road or bridge (public, state or county) in proper repair.
2 Sheley v. Swing, 65 Ohio App. io9, z9 N.E. (zd) 364. (1939).
a248 N.Y. 339, 16z N.E. 99 (I928).
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from the hands of a man boarding the train by an employee of the
defendant. The court held that to recover, plaintiff must be in the
apparent zone of danger of defendant's negligent act. This view has
been adopted by the Restatement of the Law of Torts.4
However, as the following cases indicate, many courts have held
defendant liable if they found that he was negligent, and that this neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, without discussing
the subject of duty owed the plaintiff.
Occasionally the doctrine is rejected. One court allowed a plaintiff
to recover for injuries received when defendant's train struck a cow
and hurled it against plaintiff who was not on the railroad track. The
court said: "On the undisputed facts defendant was not guilty of want
of care or negligence in respect to any duty which defendant owed
plaintiff individually." The fact that the defendant was negligent, and
that this negligence was the proxmate cause of the accident, was suffi-
cient in the opinion of the court to make the defendant liable.5
So in the well known motor lorry case,' the plaintiff was allowed
to recover for the death of his wife, who was apparently not within the
zone of danger of the runaway lorry; but who died as the result of fear
for the safety of her children.
Eckert v. Long Island R ailway' is an example of the rescue cases,
which the Restatement of Torts regards as an exception to the rule
requiring plaintiff to be in the zone of danger.8 In this case the plaintiff,
who attempted to rescue one endangered by the defendant's negligence,
was allowed to recover. Usually courts state in such cases that attempted
rescue is a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. But to say
that moral force, which acts upon the rescuer and causes him to endanger
himself, thus widens the zone of danger so that he is included, is to beg
the question, by looking back at defendant's negligence in the light of its
ultimate results.
But where, as in the principal case, the statute prescribes the standard
of conduct to be followed, the courts much more consistently require
that the plaintiff establish himself as one of the class of people for whose
benefit the statute was enacted. The cases of Marsh v. Koons,' and
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Lidtke0 indicate
that the Ohio view is in accord with this statement. The former case
'AMEICAN LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTs, section z8x.
'Alabama G.S. R.R. v. Chapman, So Ala. 6x, 2 So. 738 (1887).
'Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. (x9z5) x K.B. 141.
143 N.Y. oz, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (187).
'AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE RE sTATEMENT OF LAW OF ToRTS, section 472.
78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N.E. S99 (x9aS).
6o Ohio St. 384, 69 N.E. 53 (1904).
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involved a statute" which required that cattle be fenced. A cow strayed
onto the highway, and frightened plaintiff's horse, which resulted in
injury to the plaintiff. Declaring that the object of the statute was the
prevention of trespasses, and not the safety of travelers, the court denied
plaintiff recovery. The statute' 2 in the latter case required the railroad
company to build a fence which it failed to do. A six-year-old boy who
wandered onto the tracks was injured by a train. Denying recovery,
the court said that the fence required by statute was one sufficient to
turn stock, and not one that would keep persons from going onto the
tracks.
In the principal case, the court held that plaintiff could not recover
because she was not a member of the class which the statute was designed
to benefit, viz., travelers upon the road. But conceivably, it could be
argued that the fire engine was traveling on the road for the intended
benefit of the plaintiff, and, due to the negligence of the county, was
unable to travel beyond a certain point, resulting in the destruction of
plaintiff's house.
Of course, the services of the fire department are governmental func-
tions, and, as such, in the absence of statute, no liability could be
imposed on the political subdivision, under which it operates, even if it
were negligent.' But, there is increasing authority holding one liable
for negligence in preventing a third person from rendering aid to
plaintiff, even though the third party was under no legal duty to do so.4
Thus a railroad has been held liable for obstructing a fire engine in
going to a fire by blocking the street. 5 But in most of the cases holding
defendant liable, for preventing the rendering of aid to third persons,
the negligence of defendant took place after the need for aid had arisen,
where, as here, there was nothing that defendant could do at the time
of the fire. An analogous situation is presented in Concordia Fire Iz-
surance Co. v. Simmon,' 6 where a defendant's negligence consisted of
puncturing water lines, a week before the fire broke out. Allowing
plaintiff to recover, the court said: "So long as the householder or inhab-
itant of the city is in a position to receive and the municipality is ready
"1 Revised Statutes, Sections 4202 and 4206.
1Revised Statutes, Section 3324.
"3Aldrch v. Youngstown, io6 Ohio St. 342, 27 A.L.R. 1497 (19zz). See Onso G.C.
section 3714-3.
"Kiernan v. Metro. Construction Co., 170 Mass. 378, 49 N.E. 648 (1898); Little
Rock Traction and Electric Co. v. McCaskill, 75 Ark. 133, 70 L.R.A. 68o (9o5);
Cleveland C.C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Tauer, 376 Ind. 6zi, 96 N.E. 758 (933); Metallic
C.C. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co., 3o9 Mass. 277, i2 Am. Rep. 689 (872); Clark v.
G.T.W.R. Co., x49 Mich. 400, 142 N.W. 3z2 (1907).
" Houren v. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 236 Ill. 67o, 86 N.E. 6xs
(igo8).
16 x67 Wis. 541, x68 N.W. 399 (3938).
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and willing to continue such services, the person who interferes with
such relationship between municipality and its inhabitant and thereby
causes injury to such householder or inhabitant must respond for such
damages as may be directly traceable to his interference as a proximate
cause." '
The cases last discussed were against private defendants. Here, the
action is against the county commissioners. And at common law, both
the maintenance of roads and fire fighting apparatus were governmental
functions, so that there could be no action against county commissioners
for so negligently maintaining highways that fire engines could not travel
on them." But since a statute now imposes a duty on public authorities
to keep streets in repair, the defendant would be liable for injuries prox-
imately caused by its negligence. A search has revealed only two cases
in which the plaintiff suffered damage because of the negligence of a
political subdivision in failing to keep roads in proper repair so that fire
fighting apparatus could reach the fire. Both of these were in Kentucky.
The reasoning involved in the first of these, Hazel v. Owemboro,'8
was relied on in the instant case. The court there held that the dis-
repair of the street was not the proximate cause of the accident, although
it conceded that the city would be liable for injury to travelers resulting
from defects in the highway. The court insisted that any loss was "alto-
gether problematical," and that "the connection between the condition
of the street and the fire is too remote, in fact there is none."
In the second, a later case, Small v. Frankfort,9 the court sustained
a demurrer to plaintiff's petition, in which plaintiff had made all the
necessary allegations as to negligence, duty and proximate cause, saying:
"The demurrer admitted all the facts sufficiently pleaded. Notwith-
standing this no cause of action is stated, for the city is not liable because
in the exercise of governmental functions, its agents neglected to
perform duties incumbent upon them, thus allowing the street to become
defective,... and failed to provide the fire department with a reasonably
sufficient amount of hose. . ." The court apparently sees no insuperable
difficulty in a causation argument, and had the Kentucky defendant been
under a statutory duty to keep the road in repair, the result might have
been different.
The causation argument does not seem particularly persuasive. One
might as readily say: "What kind of damage can be more a proximate
173 Oio Dxosis-Couh-rIrs: Section III, p. 230. "A board of county commis-
sioners is not liable in its official capacity for damages for negligent discharge of its
official duties except in so far as liability is created by statute."IS o Ky. L. Rep. 627, 99 S.W. 3.S (1907).
1203 Ky. ISS, 33 A.L.R. 69z (z924).
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consequence of the want of water than the destruction by fire of a house
which a proper supply of water would have saved? It is the immediate
consequence of the proximate cause." 2
Upon its zone of duty argument, the court seems to be on stronger
grounds. While plausible arguments might be made either way on this
point, it is believed that most courts would support the view taken by
the court, that the plaintiff was not within the class protected by the
statute. S.L.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The plaintiffs drove to the defendant's gasoline station to have their
car lubricated. The defendant was then engaged in blending gasoline
of different grades of volatility. The vapors arising from the gasoline
exploded and caused injury to the plaintiffs. In action of negligence it
was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was applicable.'
The phrase literally translated means, "the thing speaks for itself."
The classic legal definition was given by Erle J. in Scott v. London
Docks Go. as follows: "When the thing is shown to be under the man-
agement of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."'
The doctrine has probably been most frequently invoked in carrier
cases. It has been applied where the plaintiff was injured as a result
of a collision of two trains of the defendant,' and also where plaintiff's
injury was due to the collision of defendant's train with that of another
carrier.' Derailment cases have been a frequent subject for its applica-
tion.' Likewise the plaintiff was permitted to rely upon it in the upset-
ting of a stagecoach.' The court applied it to the case in which the
plaintiff, while waiting on the defendant's car, was struck on the
head by the falling of the trolley pole from the top of the electric car.'
' Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., Law Rep. 6 Exch. 404.
(1871).
ZHiell v. The Golco Oil Co., 137 Ohio St. iSo, z8 N.E. (2d) 56!, 27 Ohio Op.
544, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 429 (1940).
23 H. & C. 596, Exchequer court (z865).
'The Iron Railroad Co. v. John Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418, 38 Am. Rep. 597 (881).4 Toledo Consolidated Street Railway Co. v. Fuller et al., 17 Ohio C. C. 562, 9 Ohio
C. D. 123 (1894).
'Lake Shore Electric Railway Co. v. Hobart, 32 Ohio C. C. 254, 13 Ohio C. C.
N. S. 592 (19o9).
'McKinney v. Neil, i Ohio Fed. Dec. 703, 2 McLean 540 (1839).
'Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio St. 379, 78 N.E. 529, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 98o (i9o6).
